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Note from the Author & Editors:
This Essay addresses a concerning issue that has recently arisen in
trademark law—the use of offensive language, including racial slurs, as
trademarks. Discussing and using offensive language in any professional
setting, including academic scholarship, is challenging and fraught with
controversy. During oral argument in Iancu v. Brunetti, one of the cases
discussed in this piece, Justice Gorsuch pleaded: “I don’t want to go through
the examples. I really don’t want to do that.” +
The unfortunate reality, as this Essay discusses, is that highly offensive
racial slurs and other terms can potentially be registered as trademarks after
Brunetti and Matal v. Tam. To depict this “new reality” and to provide a
visualization of the ramifications of these cases, we are choosing to include
certain racial slurs and visuals, unaltered, as examples of the types of words
and images that could now appear as trademarks. For one particular racial
epithet, however, we choose to alter its presentation, using asterisks to
replace certain internal letters therein.
It is not our intention to cause harm to any readers, or to be insensitive in
our choice to use offensive and hurtful terms, whether altered or unaltered.
We made our decisions after several careful and thorough discussions within
the Emory Law Journal staff and with the greater Emory Law School
community. We understand that the use of the racial slurs below will be
distressing to some readers, and we respect that readers may want to avoid
reading this Essay because of the presence of such material.

+

Transcript of Oral Argument at 21, Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294 (2019) (No. 18-302).
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ESSAY
TAM THROUGH THE LENS OF BRUNETTI:
THE SLANTS, FUCT
Ilhyung Lee *
Is there now a constitutional right to register a racial epithet as a
trademark? 1 In Matal v. Tam, the Supreme Court unanimously struck down
a provision of the Lanham Act that prohibits the registration of a trademark
that “may disparage … persons” 2 as violative of the Free Speech clause of
the First Amendment. 3 Two plurality opinions emerged (signed on by four
members each), but all eight Justices 4 agreed that the statute impermissibly
allows for viewpoint discrimination.5 The Court’s ruling thus required the
Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) to grant registration of “THE SLANTS”
to an Asian American band, which adopted the derogatory term for persons
of Asian descent purportedly to “reclaim” and “take ownership” of the
stereotype. 6
Since the issue of the constitutionality of the disparagement clause was
joined in Tam’s prior proceedings before the Court of Appeals for the Federal

*
Edward W. Hinton Professor of Law & Director, Center for the Study of Dispute Resolution,
University of Missouri. I thank Gary Myers for his comments and suggestions on a previous version of
this Essay.
1
A trademark is used in connection with “goods,” and a service mark for “services.” Lanham Act,
15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012) (defining “trademark” and “service mark”). Unless the context dictates
otherwise, I refer to “trademark” or “mark” to include both trademarks and service marks.
2
15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2012).
3
Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1763 (2017) (plurality opinion of Alito, J., joined by Roberts,
C.J., Thomas & Breyer, JJ.); id. at 1765 (plurality opinion of Kennedy, J., joined by Ginsburg, Sotomayor
& Kagan, JJ.).
4
When the case reached the Court, Justice Gorsuch had not yet assumed the vacant seat at Justice
Antonin M. Scalia’s death.
5
Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1763 (plurality opinion of Alito, J., joined by Roberts, C.J., Thomas & Breyer,
JJ.); id. at 1765 (plurality opinion of Kennedy, J., joined by Ginsburg, Sotomayor & Kagan, JJ.).
6
Id. at 1754 (quoting In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc)).
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Circuit, 7 there have been applications to register marks containing racial
epithets. 8 Some have a filing date of June 19, 2017, 9 the date of the Supreme
7
In re Tam, 785 F.3d 567, 573 (Fed. Cir.), vacated and reh’g en banc granted, 600 F. App’x 775
(Fed. Cir.) (en banc) (per curiam), and vacated and remanded, 808 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc).
8
Examples, from the trademark search function on the PTO’s Internet site, https://www.uspto.
gov/trademarks-application-process/search-trademark-database:

Application to Register CHINK, U.S. PAT. AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, https://www.uspto.gov/
trademarks-application-process/search-trademark-database (follow “Search our trademark database
(TESS)” hyperlink; select “Basic Word Mark Search (New User)”; then search for “CHINK” and
select the word mark “CHINK” with Serial Number 87499767 (evidencing an abandoned application
to register the word mark “CHINK” for “on-line retail store services featuring clothing, posters,
pillows, mugs, tote bags, and mobile electronics cases and covers”));
Application to Register JAP, U.S. PAT. AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, https://www.uspto.gov/
trademarks-application-process/search-trademark-database (follow “Search our trademark database
(TESS)” hyperlink; select “Basic Word Mark Search (New User)”; then search for “JAP” and select
the word mark “JAP” with Serial Number 86840326 (evidencing an abandoned application to register
the word mark “JAP” for “Bed blankets; Bed canopies; Bed covers; Bed linen;” and other goods and
services));
Application to Register JAPAROLL, U.S. PAT. AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, https://www.uspto.gov/
trademarks-application-process/search-trademark-database (follow “Search our trademark database
(TESS)” hyperlink; select “Basic Word Mark Search (New User)”; then search for “JAPAROLL”
and select the word mark “JAPAROLL” with Serial Number 87509375 (evidencing an approved
application to register the word mark “JAPAROLL” for “Sushi”));
Application to Register JAPS, U.S. PAT. AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, https://www.uspto.gov/
trademarks-application-process/search-trademark-database (follow “Search our trademark database
(TESS)” hyperlink; select “Basic Word Mark Search (New User)”; then search for “JAPS” and select
the word mark “JAPS” with Serial Number 87348142 (evidencing an approved application to register
the word mark “JAPS” for “Alarm monitoring systems; Audio-receivers and video-receivers”));
Application to Register MR. CHINK, U.S. PAT. AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, https://www.uspto.gov/
trademarks-application-process/search-trademark-database (follow “Search our trademark database
(TESS)” hyperlink; select “Basic Word Mark Search (New User)”; then search for “MR. CHINK”
and select the word mark “MR. CHINK” with Serial Number 87819515 (evidencing an abandoned
application to register the word mark “MR. CHINK” for “Basketball related sporting goods and
equipment”)).
9
Examples, from the trademark search function on the PTO’s internet site, https://www.uspto.
gov/trademarks-application-process/search-trademark-database, follow. Note: In the citations below,
each mark that contains asterisks within is, in the search query, fully spelled out:

Application to Register N***A, U.S. PAT. AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, https://www.uspto.gov/
trademarks-application-process/search-trademark-database (follow “Search our trademark database
(TESS)” hyperlink; select “Basic Word Mark Search (New User)”; then search for “N***A” and
select the word mark “N***A” with Serial Number 87496454 (evidencing a pending application to
register the word mark “N***A” for “Athletic apparel, namely, shirts, pants, jackets, footwear, hats
and caps, athletic uniforms” and other goods);
Application to Register N***A, U.S. PAT. AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, https://www.uspto.gov/
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Court’s decision. Tam took “racial slurs … off the table,” 10 and the PTO
began approving them. 11 But not all racial slurs are created equal. For a time
post-Tam, the agency held in abeyance applications that incorporated “the
single-most offensive racial slur,” 12 given the then pending Iancu v.
Brunetti. 13 In Brunetti, the agency had denied registration of “FUCT,” for a
clothing line, under a related provision of the Act that bars registration of
“immoral … or scandalous matter.” 14 And there was the possibility that some
racial epithets might be deemed “scandalous” and thus banned from
registration. 15 But it was not to be. Evoking Tam, Justice Kagan announced
for a majority of the Court in Brunetti, “We hold that [the immoral or
scandalous] provision infringes the First Amendment for the same reason: It
too disfavors certain ideas.” 16 The Chief Justice and Justices Breyer and
Sotomayor filed separate opinions, each concurring with the majority
regarding “immoral” marks but dissenting with respect to “scandalous”
terms. 17
My difficulty with Tam is its pronouncement of a fundamental right to
register a racial epithet as a mark under the federal trademark system. Not a

trademarks-application-process/search-trademark-database (follow “Search our trademark database
(TESS)” hyperlink; select “Basic Word Mark Search (New User)”; then search for “N***A” and
select the word mark “N***A” with Serial Number 87496567 (evidencing an abandoned application
to register the word mark “N***A” for “Retail store services featuring clothing, books, music and
general merchandise”);
Application to Register N****R PLEASE, U.S. PAT. AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, https://www.uspto.
gov/trademarks-application-process/search-trademark-database (follow “Search our trademark
database (TESS)” hyperlink; select “Basic Word Mark Search (New User)”; then search for “N****R
PLEASE” and select the word mark “N****R PLEASE” with Serial Number 87495357 (evidencing
an abandoned application to register the word mark “N****R PLEASE” for “Shirts”).
These and other applications are also noted in Sonia K. Katyal, Brands Behaving Badly, 109 TRADEMARK
REP. 819, 825 (2019).
10
Transcript of Oral Argument at 23, Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294 (2019) (No. 18-302).
11
See id. at 46.
12
Id. at 61.
13
139 S. Ct. 2294 (2019).
14
15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2012). As the Court noted, “Both a PTO examining attorney and the PTO’s
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board decided that Brunetti’s mark flunked that test.” Brunetti, 139 S. Ct.
at 2298.
15
See Transcript of Oral Argument at 61, Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294 (No. 18-302).
16
Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2297.
17
Id. at 2303 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 2304 (Breyer, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 2308–09 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
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single member of the Court could advance a theory to uphold the agency’s
decision to refuse registration. Perhaps the available options that would have
exempted the case from the jaws of the Free Speech mandates were not
inviting. That is, per the Tam text: A trademark is not government speech,18
a government subsidy, 19 or a government program. 20 And even if a trademark
were deemed to be commercial speech, which would trigger a less
heightened review under Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public
Service Commission, 21 four members of the Court stated that Tam could not
satisfy even the lesser standard. 22
My own view is that since the Government provides a federal trademark
system that grants significant benefits to registrants, 23 those who wish to
avail themselves of such benefits must play by the rules that the Government
sets. In short, there is Government involvement, 24 and federal registration
means something. I also think that the Government does or should have an
interest in not registering marks with certain content. These points carried
little weight in the ultimate decision in Tam. They do appear, however, in
the separate opinions in Brunetti. For example, Justice Sotomayor noted
Government involvement in the promotion of marks, 25 and also wrote that
“the Government has an interest in not promoting certain kinds of speech,
18

Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1760 (2017) (8-0).
Id. at 1760–61 (plurality opinion of Alito, J., joined by Roberts, C.J., Thomas & Breyer, JJ.).
20
Id. at 1763.
21
447 U.S. 557 (1980).
22
Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1763–64 (plurality opinion of Alito, J., joined by Roberts, C.J., Thomas &
Breyer, JJ.) (citing Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. 557).
23
See id. at 1753. As the Court elaborated in Tam:
19

Registration on the principal register (1) “serves as ‘constructive notice of the registrant’s
claim of ownership’ of the mark,” (2) “is ‘prima facie evidence of the validity of the
registered mark and of the registration of the mark, of the owner’s ownership of the mark,
and of the owner’s exclusive right to use the registered mark in commerce on or in
connection with the goods or services specified in the certificate,’” and (3) can make a
mark “‘incontestable’” [“]once a mark has been registered for five years[.]” Registration
also enables the trademark holder “to stop the importation into the United States of articles
bearing an infringing mark.”
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1317 (2015)).
24
See Brief of Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of the Petitioner at 25, Tam, 137 S. Ct.
1744 (No. 15-1293), 2016 WL 6833413; Rebecca Tushnet, The First Amendment Walks into a Bar:
Trademark Registration and Free Speech, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 381, 393 (2016).
25
Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2317 (2019) (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 1062, 1124 (2012)); Brief for United States at 35, Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294
(18-302).
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whether because such speech could be perceived as suggesting governmental
favoritism or simply because the Government does not wish to involve itself
with that kind of speech.” 26 Similarly, Justice Breyer urged that “[t]he
Government … has an interest in seeking to disincentivize the use of [some]
words in commerce by denying the benefit of trademark registration.” 27 As
discussed herein, I ask whether these rationalizations noted in the Brunetti
dissents indicate some sense of buyer’s (majority) regret in Tam or belated
recognition of Tam’s consequences.
I readily acknowledge the copyright conundrum. Does not the
Government also allow registration of racial slurs in books, songs, and films,
among others, all of which have federal copyright registration? The answer
is that there is an inherent difference between copyright and trademark.
Whereas “[c]opyright protects the expression in a work[,] … trademark is
about protecting a source link rather than a work in itself.” 28 Moreover,
Congressional authority to provide copyright protection is explicitly
provided in the Constitution. 29 In contrast, its authority to enact legislation
regulating trademarks is based on the Commerce Clause. 30 Yet the
copyright/trademark distinction was insufficient to sway the Court in Tam,
as the Justices focused on the expressive content of trademarks, and the First
Amendment reigned supreme. 31
For free speech advocates who prefer few to no restrictions on
expression, Tam was a case with “favorable facts.” 32 In the hierarchy of

26

Id. at 2317 (first citing Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass’n, 555 U.S. 353, 359–60 (2009); then
citing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc. 473 U.S. 788, 809 (1985)).
27
Id. at 2307 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Brandenburg v. Ohio,
395 U. S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam)).
28
Tushnet, supra note 24, at 422.
29
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“The Congress shall have Power … [t]o promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries ….”).
30
See Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012) (“The intent of this chapter is to regulate commerce
within the control of Congress by making actionable the deceptive and misleading use of marks in such
commerce; to protect registered marks used in such commerce from interference by State, or territorial
legislation; to protect persons engaged in such commerce against unfair competition; to prevent fraud and
deception in such commerce by the use of reproductions, copies, counterfeits, or colorable imitations of
registered marks; and to provide rights and remedies stipulated by treaties and conventions respecting
trademarks, trade names, and unfair competition entered into between the United States and foreign
nations.”).
31
Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1760.
32
Mark Conrad, Matal v. Tam – A Victory for the Slants, A Touchdown for the Redskins, but an
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racial epithets, slants is not the most offensive or hideous. It is a term that
has multiple definitions, most of which are not racially disparaging. 33
Perhaps a case with more challenging facts would have been “THE
CHINKS,” because although the term too has a non-racial alternative
meaning 34 (as seen in the phrase “chink in the armor”), its use in the
contemporary setting is controversial and generally discouraged, given its
close identification as a racial slur. 35
Would the Court in Tam have reached the same result, or with the same
ease or unanimity, if the mark in question were the more unambiguous “THE
GOOKS”? Webster’s defines the term as “a native belonging usu[ally] to a
brown or yellow race—usu[ally] used disparagingly.” 36 Wikipedia describes
it as “a derogatory term for certain people of East and Southeast Asian
descent. The slur is frequently directed toward foreigners, especially people
of Filipino, Korean, or Vietnamese descent.” 37 Perhaps the band in Tam
could have more vividly expressed its mission of re-appropriating a muchhated slur with an eye-catching “ME, GOOK,” 38 or the more collectivist and
community-minded “WE, GOOKS.”
In all events, the Court in Tam was well aware of the racial trope in the
mark at hand. Justice Kennedy’s opinion, joined by three others, specifically
acknowledged “The Slants” as “a racial epithet.”39 More importantly, the
Court had notice of the consequences of a decision to allow registration. The

Ambiguous Journey for the First Amendment and Trademark Law, 36 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 83,
123 (2018).
33
See WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
UNABRIDGED 2137 (2002). Webster’s does include “slant-eye” as an entry and defines it: “a person with
slanting eyes; esp: one of Mongoloid ancestry—usu. taken to be offensive.” Id.
34
Id. at 391 (defining “chink” as, among others, “an opening, space, break, or hole typically of
greater length than width …”).
35
Id. (“CHINESE—usu. taken to be offensive[.]”); see Chink in One’s Armor, WIKIPEDIA,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chink_in_one%27s_armor (last visited Nov. 2, 2019) (discussing
etymology and controversy of phrase).
36
WEBSTER’S, supra note 33, at 979.
37
Gook, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gook (last visited Nov. 2, 2019) (footnote and
citation omitted). “It was originally predominantly used by the U.S. military during wartime, especially
during the Korean War, and more so during the Vietnam War.” Id. (footnotes and citations omitted).
38
This is the purported transliteration of the Korean 미국, meaning “America.” NAVER ENGLISH
DICTIONARY, https://endic.naver.com/search.nhn?sLn=en&isOnlyViewEE=N&query=미국 (last visited
Nov. 2, 2019).
39
Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1766 (2017) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment).
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Government explicitly argued that it should not be required to register “the
vilest racial epithets.” 40 This lead in the parade-of-horribles was not enough
to sway the Court. Per Justice Alito (with three others), quoting Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes: “Speech that demeans on the basis of race,
ethnicity, gender, religion, age, disability, or any other similar ground is
hateful; but the proudest boast of our free speech jurisprudence is that we
protect the freedom to express ‘the thought that we hate.’” 41
Another consequence of the free expression result in Tam is that the
motivation or purpose of the trademark registrant is not relevant. Tam does
not distinguish between the applicant who desires to “reclaim” or “own” a
stereotype toward an empowering mission, or one who wishes to assert racial
superiority and spew hate. 42 That is, after all, the essence of a rule that
prohibits discrimination on the basis of content or viewpoint. Thus,
presumably, a party would be able to register “GOOKS FOR DUKES” (for,
say, consulting services relating to admission at elite universities), while
another may register “NUKES FOR GOOKS” (for association services
supporting an entirely different purpose).
The Lanham Act contemplates a very broad category of what may qualify
as a trademark—“any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination
thereof.” 43 In addition to words (e.g., “THE SLANTS”), slogans (e.g.,
“JUST DO IT”), logos (e.g., McDonald’s golden arches), and, though
relatively rare, even a color (by itself, and not as part of a combination),44
and a sound 45 may also serve as a mark. Given the result in Tam, one wonders
if a sound identified with racial connotations or stereotypes could receive
trademark registration. Take the “Asian jingle,” or per Wikipedia, the
“Oriental riff.” 46 It is a sequence of musical notes 47 comprising a melody
40

Transcript of Oral Argument at 50, Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (No. 15-1293).
Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1764 (quoting United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U. S. 644, 655 (1929)
(Holmes, J., dissenting)).
42
As Professor Katyal has stated, “Just as [the Court] empowered individuals like … Tam to
reclaim and reappropriate historically derogatory terms, it also now extends protection to the most
entrepreneurial of haters, too.” Katyal, supra note 9, at 824.
43
15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012) (defining “trademark” and “service mark”).
44
See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 161, 162, 166 (1995).
45
See 1 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 7:104 (5th ed. 2019)
(providing examples of sounds that have received registration, including, among several others, “NBC
chimes,” “MGM lion’s roar,” and “Yahoo yodel”).
46
Oriental Riff, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oriental_riff (last visited Nov. 2, 2019).
47
For the less acquainted, an audio of the melody is readily available on the Internet. See File:
41
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“that has often been used in Western culture as a trope or stereotype of
orientalism to represent the idea of Mainland China, Japan, Korea, Taiwan
or a generic East Asian theme.” 48 Could this trope be a registered trademark?
Whereas “THE SLANTS” in Tam was a word mark incorporating a
disparaging term for persons of Asian descent—apparently referring to their
eye shape—the following offers a visual depiction of the term:

Fig. 1
Or consider this less ambiguous graphic:

Fig. 2

Asian Riff Accurate.mid, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Asian_Riff_Accurate.mid (last
visited Nov. 2, 2019).
48
Oriental Riff, supra note 46.
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In the post-Tam era, the question is whether Fig. 1 or 2 may qualify as
constitutionally protected expression in a registrable trademark. The
question is not beyond the pale. Note the following exchange between Justice
Kennedy and counsel for the Asian American band at oral argument in Tam:
JUSTICE KENNEDY: Suppose we had this hypothetical case. The
facts are largely parallel to these, other than the band are non-Asians,
they use makeup to exaggerate slanted eyes, and they make fun of
Asians. Could the government, under a properly-drawn statute, decline
to register that as a trademark in your view?
MR. CONNELL: They could not.
JUSTICE KENNEDY: The First Amendment protects absolutely
outrageous speech insofar as trademarks are concerned.
MR. CONNELL: That is correct.
JUSTICE KENNEDY: I think you have to take that position.
MR. CONNELL: Well, we take that position…. 49

A depiction of Fig. 1 received national attention during the 2017 World
Series between the Houston Astros and the Los Angeles Dodgers. In the third
game, Houston batter Yuli Gurriel hit a home run off Dodgers’ pitcher Yu
Darvish. “After Gurriel returned to the dugout, he was captured on camera
smiling and then raising his hands as if to stretch the sides of his eyes. It
seemed to be a clear, and pointedly insensitive, reference to Darvish, who is
from Japan.” 50 Gurriel’s gesture, like many trademarks, expressed a
viewpoint, to wit (as Gurriel explained after the game): Teammates, maybe
Darvish thought that I was Japanese too and that’s why he gave me a good
pitch to hit. 51

49

Transcript of Oral Argument at 27–28, Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017) (No. 15-1293).
David Waldstein, Astros’ Yuli Gurriel Escapes World Series Ban, but Will Miss 5 Games in
2018, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 28, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/28/sports/baseball/yuli-gurrielapologizes-racist-yu-darvish.html. Gurriel also “mouth[ed] the word ‘chinito,’ which translates to
something along the lines of ‘little Chinese boy.’” Dylan Hernandez, Some Look Askew at Yuli Gurriel’s
Dugout Squint, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 28, 2017), https://www.latimes.com/sports/la-sp-dodgers-hernandez20171027-story.html. A condensed video of the incident is readily available on the Internet.
G4MarchMadnessHD, Yuli Gurriel Mocks Yu Darvish After Home Run - Astros vs Dodgers WS Gm3,
YOUTUBE (Oct. 28, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0aPEEWPAyA4.
51
See Waldstein, supra note 50.
50

LEE_11.21.19

2019]

11/27/2019 12:23 PM

TAM THROUGH THE LENS OF BRUNETTI

2011

The problem is that the gesture also has a patently offensive meaning, at
least to some. 52 The day after the gesture-filled game, Major League Baseball
Commissioner Rob Manfred declared:
There is complete unanimity—me, my office, both owners, both clubs
and the [Major League Baseball Players Association]—that there is no
place in our game for the behavior or any behavior like the behavior
we witnessed last night. There is no excuse or explanation that makes
that type of behavior acceptable. 53

The Commissioner suspended Gurriel for five games without pay, though
the suspension would not take effect until the beginning of the following
regular season. 54 Compare the Commissioner’s decision with the policy of
the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission relating to
discrimination or harassment at the workplace:
Ethnic slurs and other verbal or physical conduct because of
nationality are illegal if they are severe or pervasive and create an
intimidating, hostile or offensive working environment, interfere with
work performance, or negatively affect job opportunities. Examples of
potentially unlawful conduct include insults, taunting, or ethnic
epithets, such as making fun of a person’s foreign accent or comments
like, “Go back to where you came from,” whether made by supervisors
or by co-workers. 55

All of this leaves a most perplexing state of affairs. There is no place for
certain gestures in America’s national pastime (per the Commissioner’s
office), and such acts in the workplace violate federal law (per the EEOC).
Yet, under Tam, such a gesture packaged as a trademark may have a place in
the rolls of the Principal Register, as a matter of Free Speech. To build on an
observation from Judge Jimmie V. Reyna, who, dissenting from the en banc
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit decision in Tam, in turn borrowed
from Justice John Paul Stevens: “[F]ew of us would march our sons and
daughters off to war to preserve the citizen’s right” to register a racial epithet

52

But others might question whether it is offensive, given the context. See, e.g., Hernandez, supra

note 50.
53
Commissioner Manfred Pregame Interview, MLB (Oct. 28, 2017), https://www.mlb.com/news/
commissioner-manfred-pregame-interview-c259953862.
54
Id. Gurriel was also required to undergo sensitivity training during the offseason. Id. He
apologized for his actions. Hernandez, supra note 50.
55
U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Immigrants’ Employment Rights Under
Federal
Anti-Discrimination
Laws,
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/publications/immigrants-facts.
cfm (referring to “Harassment Based on National Origin”).
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as a trademark, which, if mimicked in person at the workplace, would result
in a suspension. 56
As noted, in Tam, a unanimous Court ruled that a racial slur could not be
denied registration under the “disparagement clause” of the Lanham Act; in
Brunetti, a divided Court struck down the “immoral … or scandalous”
provision of the Act, to allow registration of “the equivalent of the past
participle form of the … paradigmatic profane word in our culture.” 57 I see
in Brunetti signs of second thoughts from some Justices regarding the reach
of Tam and its consequences. Or at a minimum, the reasons advanced in
Brunetti for not allowing the registration of “FUCT” and similar terms could
have been advanced with equal vigor in Tam in relation to racial slurs, but
they were not.
The first indication came from Justice Breyer, who at oral argument
raised a question about racial slurs, an issue already decided by Tam two
terms before: “I’ve looked into [it] a little, and there are certain [racial slurs]
that have exactly the same physiological effect on a person … as the word
we’re using here [fuct], and there is a physiological effect.” 58 He continued,
“[I]t’s stored in a different place in the brain. It leads to retention of the word.
There are lots of physiological effect[s] with very few words. It’s not too
hard … to think of a racial slur that has exactly the same effect.” 59 Justice
Breyer elaborated on this point in his separate opinion in Brunetti, in which
his discussion of “highly vulgar or obscene speech” returned to racial
epithets:
[S]cientific evidence suggests that certain highly vulgar words have a
physiological and emotional impact that makes them different in kind
from most other words. These vulgar words originate in a different part
of our brains than most other words. And these types of swear words
tend to attract more attention and are harder to forget than other words.
Notably, that has remained true even as the list of offensive swear
words has changed over time: In the last few centuries, the list has
evolved away from words of religious disrespect and toward words
that are sexually explicit or that crudely describe bodily functions. And

56
In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (en banc) (Reyna, J., dissenting) (first citing
Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 70 (1976) (Stevens, J.); then citing McCann v.
Anthony, 21 Mo. App. 83, 91–92 (1886)).
57
Transcript of Oral Argument at 8, Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294 (2019) (No. 18-302).
58
Id. at 23–24.
59
Id. at 24.

LEE_11.21.19

2019]

11/27/2019 12:23 PM

TAM THROUGH THE LENS OF BRUNETTI

2013

the list of swear words may be evolving yet again, perhaps in the
direction of including race-based epithets.
These attention-grabbing words, though financially valuable to
some businesses that seek to attract interest in their products, threaten
to distract consumers and disrupt commerce. And they may lead to the
creation of public spaces that many will find repellant, perhaps on
occasion creating the risk of verbal altercations or even physical
confrontations. (Just think about how you might react if you saw
someone wearing a t-shirt or using a product emblazoned with an
odious racial epithet.) 60

Recall that Justice Breyer joined the plurality opinion in Tam (along with
Justice Alito, the Chief Justice, and Justice Thomas) that proclaimed that
“[s]peech that demeans on the basis of race [or] ethnicity … is hateful,” but
protected. 61 One wonders about the change in Justice Breyer’s direction. On
the matter of the physiological impact of a racial slur on a person, at the
Brunetti stage, it was too little, too late.
Moreover, the Chief Justice and Justices Breyer and Sotomayor,
dissenting from the Court’s decision allowing registration of “FUCT,” all
advanced the Government’s interest in not associating itself with, promoting,
or lending its ancillary support to marks that are vulgar or obscene. 62 It is a
fair question to ask whether the Government may have a similar interest
regarding the trademark registration of hateful racial epithets.
Then there is the separate concurring opinion from Justice Alito, the
author of the Opinion of the Court in Tam. There, it was he who, rejecting
the analogy between trademarks that involve disparagement of race (among
others) with discriminatory conduct, wrote in one entirely unnecessary
passage that the disparagement clause “is not an antidiscrimination clause; it
is a happy-talk clause.” 63 In Brunetti, although Justice Alito joined the

60
Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2307 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis
added) (citations omitted).
61
Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1764 (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644,
655 (1929) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
62
Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2303 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 2307
(Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 2317 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). The Chief Justice and Justice Sotomayor also added “profane” speech to the list. Id.
at 2303 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 2317 (Sotomayor, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
63
Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1765.
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majority’s decision, he wrote separately, contemplating a different result
under a more narrowly written statute:
Our decision does not prevent Congress from adopting a more
carefully focused statute that precludes the registration of marks
containing vulgar terms that play no real part in the expression of
ideas. The particular mark in question in this case could be denied
registration under such a statute. The term suggested by that mark is
not needed to express any idea and, in fact, as commonly used today,
generally signifies nothing except emotion and a severely limited
vocabulary. The registration of such marks serves only to further
coarsen our popular culture. 64

To be clear, Justice Alito was referring to vulgar terms, not racial
epithets. Nevertheless, the passage invites questions. What part does a term
like gooks or the image in Fig. 2 play in the “expression of ideas”? Some
part, to be sure, but any more than fuct? Is the racial slur or image “needed
to express any idea,” or instead, does its use signify little “except emotion
and a severely limited vocabulary”? 65 And why the concern about “further
coarsen[ing] our popular culture” if such marks are allowed registration? If
Justice Alito’s opinion in Tam was one to thwart the forces of “political
correctness,” 66 his concurrence in Brunetti seems to have evened the tally.
To Justice Alito’s point, Congress may indeed make law, in the aftermath
of Brunetti, with narrower and more explicit language to prohibit the
registration of, say, “obscene, vulgar, or profane matter.” 67 And the Court,
divided in Brunetti, would have to reconvene to determine to what extent
vulgar or profane content in a trademark is protected by the First
Amendment. 68 Put another way, if “FUCT” can survive the “immoral … or
scandalous” prohibition, could “FUCK’D” prevail under an “obscene,
64

Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2303 (Alito, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
How much of Free Speech protections would be lost by not allowing registration of “GOOKS
GO BACK TO WHERE YOU CAME FROM,” while allowing “ASIANS GO BACK TO WHERE YOU
CAME FROM”?
66
Clay Calvert, Beyond Trademarks and Offence: Tam and the Justices’ Evolution on Free Speech,
2017 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 25, 34, 54.
67
The phrasing—obscene, vulgar, profane (or with variations of the root terms and varying
conjunctions)—appears in rote delivery in the separate opinions of the dissenters. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at
2303–04 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (appearing four times); id. at 2308,
2311, 2312–14, 2317–18 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (appearing eleven
times). Justice Breyer opted for “highly vulgar or obscene.” Id. at 2304, 2306–07 (appearing seven times).
68
Obscene matter appears already decided. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24–26 (1973),
cited in Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2311 (Sotomayor, J., concurring part and dissenting in part).
65
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vulgar, or profane” clause? With respect to racial epithets, however, selected
passages suggesting second thoughts in the Brunetti dissents
notwithstanding and barring a constitutional amendment, Tam is the law of
the land. Thus, the consumer may see “WE, GOOKS®,” though possibly not
“WE, GOOKS, FUCK’D.”
I confess that to this point, I have discussed hypothetical marks in the
context of registrability, mostly in the abstract. Under U.S. law, trademark
rights require use; 69 indeed, the very definition of trademark under the Act
requires a designation that is “used by a person, or … [that] a person has a
bona fide intention to use in commerce.” 70 As a practical matter, the question
is whether anyone would actually adopt and use “WE, GOOKS” or Fig. 2 to
sell his wares. Professor Timothy T. Hsieh doubts that Tam will lead to a
substantial increase in offensive marks, “due to goodwill concerns and
common business sense.” 71 Given the significant resources that a business
venture demands, owners are not likely to engage in any action to insult the
consuming public. In this vein, Justice Kennedy in Tam evoked “Justice
Holmes’ reference to the ‘free trade in ideas’ and the ‘power of … thought
to get itself accepted in the competition of the market[]’ …. In the realm of
trademarks, the metaphorical marketplace of ideas becomes a tangible,
powerful reality.” 72 Put another way, the market will decide whether an
offensive idea or trademark can remain, survive, and prevail. 73 In the
69
70

See MCCARTHY, supra note 45, § 16:18.
Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012) (emphasis added) (defining “trademark” and “service

mark”).
71
Timothy T. Hsieh, The Hybrid Trademark and Free Speech Forged from Matal v. Tam, 7 N.Y.U.
J. INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. 1, 19 (2018).
72
Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1767–68 (2017) (quoting Abrams v. United States, 250 U. S.
616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
73
An interesting case study is “YELLOW FEVER” for a pan-Asian restaurant. The owner wished
to select a “memorable” name. Alex Horton, Whole Foods Is Slammed over Yellow Fever Restaurant.
The Owner Says It’s Not Racist., WASH. POST (Apr. 29, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
business/wp/2018/04/28/a-yellow-fever-restaurant-opened-in-a-whole-foods-there-are-two-problemswith-that-critics-say/?noredirect=on. Like “slants,” “yellow fever” is capable of multiple meanings, one
of which is “a common reference to a term associated with a white man’s sexual fascination with Asian
women.” Id. The owner’s selection of the term for the restaurant should remind of the band’s motivation
in Tam: “[R]ather than narrowly associating it with a deadly disease or with perpetuating racial
stereotypes, we choose to embrace the term and reinterpret it positively for ourselves.” Id. But there was
also a “national outcry … with many criticizing the name’s racist undertones.” Id. The restaurant
eventually closed all three of its locations, with the owner explaining, “[A]t the end of the day if you can’t
make money you won’t survive.” Yellow Fever Restaurant Closing After Culturally Insensitivity Charge,
ASAMNEWS (June 2, 2019), https://asamnews.com/2019/06/02/yellow-fever-restaurant-closing-afterculturally-insensitivity-charge/.
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trademark context, Professor Rebecca Tushnet acknowledges the argument
that consumers will refuse to buy goods or services with truly offensive
marks and that the offensive sellers will go out of business. 74 “But that
argument,” she counters, “does not deal with disparaging marks that target
only subsets of the population; a market can segment so that racists, or even
people who just do not care about harm to the target group, can support the
trademark owner.” 75
In my own classes in trademarks, when discussing the registrability of a
hypothetical mark, I often refer to, as a default good or service, a bar
examination preparation service and related materials. Putting aside
whatever motivation one may have for selecting a mark with a racial
connotation for this endeavor, I do not imagine that “WE, GOOKS” or Fig.
2 would do well in the highly competitive bar exam preparation market. I
would rather not know how successful Fig. 1 would be as a mark for, say,
baseball instruction services. But what about the “Asian jingle” or “Oriental
riff,” used for Chinese food delivery, or a travel agency catering to tourists
going to Asia? Even if a mark is insensitive or offensive to some, the
business owner is mainly interested in all things to drive profit. If consumers
readily identify the melody as a source indicator of the commercial service,
that is the very hallmark of a trademark, 76 not to mention a successful one in
the marketplace, political correctness be damned.
There may well be entrepreneurial parties who use and register a
trademark containing a racial connotation to market their goods and services,
with or without a desire to advance a social or political message. 77 Some will
be accepted in the marketplace, while others are not, per Holmes. There will
also be those who use a mark containing words and images that we hate, in
order to advance a hateful cause with a less than altruistic viewpoint.
Trademarks with racial epithets may perpetuate stereotypes, alienate
members of American society along racial lines at a time of heightened
divisiveness, and perhaps even have a physiological impact on some persons.

74
75
76

Tushnet, supra note 24, at 388 n.25.
Id.
See Rock & Roll Hall of Fame & Museum, Inc. v. Gentile Prods., 134 F.3d 749, 755 (6th Cir.

1998).
77
For a discussion of the categories of parties likely to register offensive or disparaging marks
post-Tam, see Gary Myers, Trademarks & the First Amendment After Matal v. Tam, 26 J. INTELL. PROP.
L. 67, 95 (2019).
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All of the above marks may appear in public—online, on billboards, buses,
and possibly t-shirts, though probably not in the workplace or schools.
And all of these trademarks will appear in commerce with the
government approved “®.” That is the trouble with Tam.

